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The American people and their government have not reached
anything close to consensus on how to handle suspected terrorists.
Perhaps most controversial, the practice of "extraordinary
rendition" or "irregular rendition" sparks a heated debate.
To the consternation of the human rights community and many
others, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is believed to have
transferred around one hundred foreign suspects from areas
outside U.S. territory to countries with spotty human rights
records.' The Department of Defense (DOD), operating less in the
shadows than the CIA, has also conducted renditions. 2  After
t Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law
(john.radsan@wmitchell.edu). Professor Radsan thanks Emily Bucher and Adine
Mohmoh for their research assistance.
I The Central Intelligence Agency's Director, Michael Hayden, acknowledged the
rendition program during a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on September 7,
2007 in New York City. See General Michael Hayden, U.S.A.F., Director of Central
Intelligence Agency, Address at the National Press Club (Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2006/l/24/former nsa-head-gen-hayden-grilled#transcr
ipt (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). Rendition, the critics say, facilitates the harsh
interrogations of suspects that American authorities are not willing and able to conduct
themselves. See, e.g., Leila N. Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other
Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200, 1201 (2007).
2 See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition
and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1344 (2007).
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taking control of thousands of suspects in Afghanistan and other
places, DOD transported many of them to an American facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3  As the photographs of men carted
around in orange jumpsuits were released, and the protests against
American policies increased, DOD started to transfer some
prisoners back to their countries of origin or to other countries.
4
Other detainees, because of their perceived danger to American
national security or because the U.S. government cannot find any
countries to take them, continue to languish in Cuban limbo.
5
Strictly speaking, all the CIA and DOD transfers were irregular
renditions because they were not performed in accordance with
treaties between two sets of courts in two different countries, as
occurs in the regular practice called "extradition.
'
"
6
During the campaign against terrorism, the Bush
Administration also designated two U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants.7 Both were transferred within American custody by
irregular means, and one was subject to an irregular rendition.8
These two citizens are Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi. 9
Padilla, based on fears that he was part of a "dirty bomb"
plot, 10 was arrested at Chicago's O'Hare Airport on May 8,
2002.11 Originally held as a "material witness" in New York, he
was designated an "enemy combatant" and moved to a military
3 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,470-71 (2004).
4 See Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks to Shift Inmates from Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2005, at A1, A10.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the
Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 586-87 (2006).
7 Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Reasserts Right to Declare Citizens to Be Enemy
Combatants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A26.
8 Hamdi, found on the battlefield in Afghanistan, was subject to an irregular
rendition. See infra nn. 16-24 and accompanying text. Padilla was merely transferred
within the United States. See infra nn. 10-15 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Lichtblau, supra note 7, at A26.
lo See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). These fears were
heightened by statements that "high-level" prisoners reportedly gave in the CIA's secret
prison program.
11 See, e.g., Tim Golden, Guantanamo Terror Suspect Is Given His Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A18.
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brig in South Carolina.' 2 In 2005, after the government's theories
about enemy combatants were rejected by the Supreme Court,
Padilla was moved to Miami to face criminal charges in federal
court. 13 There, Padilla was convicted not for dirty bombs but for
material support to terrorist activities that pre-dated 9/11.14
Consequently, because Padilla remains in American custody after
his conviction in federal court, his case cannot be categorized as
an irregular rendition.15
Hamdi, the more important of the two American citizens to our
story, was captured in 2001 on a more conventional battlefield in
Afghanistan.16  Piled in with many other prisoners, he was
relocated to Guantanamo.1 7  When American authorities
confirmed that he was a United States citizen, by virtue of his birth
in Louisiana, they relocated him to a military brig, first in
Virginia, then one in South Carolina.' 8 Notwithstanding Hamdi's
domestic relocations, the American authorities continued to
designate him as an enemy combatant. 19 Unlike Padilla, however,
Hamdi was eventually able to challenge the substance of his
enemy combatant designation before the Supreme Court. Again,
the government did not do as well as it expected.21 In the fall-out
of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,22 rather than deal with the details on
remand, the government cut a deal with Hamdi.23 In exchange for
12 Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 431-32.
13 See Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges Detainee In Terrorism Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at Al.
14 Padilla was convicted on August 16, 2007. U.S. v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR,
2007 WL 2349148 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 16, 2007).
15 Padilla was sentenced to seventeen years in prison, a term he is serving now.
See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sentences Padilla to 17 Years. Cites His
Detention, WASH. POST, Jan 23, 2008, at A3.
16 The Northern Alliance, fighting with American forces, transferred Hamdi to
American control. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
2o Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510; Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR.
21 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
22 Id.
23 Press Release, Mark Corallo, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Regarding Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004), available at
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Hamdi renouncing his American citizenship, the United States
government, in an irregular rendition, transferred him to Saudi
Arabia, where he had been raised after his parents had returned to
their homeland.24
It is the Hamdi case, as I explain in this essay, which can
bridge the gap between a civil libertarian camp and an executive
supremacy camp in the development of American
counterterrorism. 2p Within Hamdi lies the possibility of a middle
way between the apologists and the severest critics of irregular
rendition.
I. Overture
No matter the abstractions or the euphemisms, rendition
involves holding human beings against their will in harsh
circumstances.26 If, as Director Michael Hayden says, the CIA
rendition program since 9/11 is on the order of one hundred
people, even one case of mistaken identity should cause a
reasonable person to doubt the fairness and effectiveness of
existing procedures. 27 Even one case in which torture results -
contrary to assurances of fair treatment from the receiving country
and contrary to post-transfer monitoring by the sending country
(or by a third party) - is a big problem for the United States in
the arena of irregular renditions. On such an important matter,
American authorities must strive for perfection.
It now seems clear, after several years of the American
rendition program, that the CIA has made at least one major
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/September/04_opa_640.htm.
24 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
25 I have already offered Hamdi as an intermediate key to determine whether the
courts should have any role in deciding financial disputes between the CIA and an
alleged spy. See A. John Radsan, Second-Guessing the Spymasters with a Judicial Role
in Espionage Deals, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1259 (2006). In that article, I explain why I am
critical of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005),
that ruled the courts do not have such a role.
26 Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1249, 1254-63 (2007) (chronicling Masri's five-month ordeal
and subsequent legal action).
27 Michael Hayden, Director, CIA, Address at the National Press Club (Sept. 7,
2007) (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14162/conversationwithmichaelhayden.rushtranscri
ptfederal-news service.html).
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mistake.28 Khaled el Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese origin,
was detained at the end of 2003 by Macedonian security
services. 29  After the Macedonians transferred him to American
custody, the CIA was said to have transferred Masri to
Afghanistan for tough talk regarding potential terrorist plots.30 It
was reported that "enhanced interrogation techniques" may have
been used.3' Months later, in a horrible twist of fate, the United
States government came to accept that its officers may have
confused the Masri they had in custody with another person who
had a similar name.32 Sad for all, they had created a problem for
themselves and for the apparently innocent person in their
custody.33  In the end, the CIA is said to have released him in
Albania to make his own way back home to Germany.
34
The immediate embarrassment for the Americans on the Masri
case was with our German allies, including the new German
leader, Angela Merkel. 35  The German authorities, to American
dismay, did not keep the errors hush-hush.36 As a form of rot at
the foundations of American counterterrorism, the Masri case
makes it much more difficult, if not impossible, for the CIA and
the rest of the agencies aligned against terrorists to maintain the
public's blind trust in unfettered executive discretion. In that
sense, Masri is to the CIA as Abu Ghraib was to the Department of
Defense. Both Masri and Abu Ghraib are major blows to
American counterterrorism. 3
7
28 See Chesney, supra note 26.
29 Id. at 1257.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1255.
32 Glen Kessler, U.S. Said to Admit German's Abduction Was an Error, On Europe
Trip, Rice Faces Scrutiny on Prisoner Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005 at A18
(discussing the el Masri affair). [hereinafter Kessler].
33 See id.
34 See Chesney, supra note 26, at 1239.
35 See Kessler, supra note 32 (discussing German reaction to the el Masri case).
36 Id. ("[l]n May 2004, then-U.S. ambassador Daniel R. Coats told the German
interior minister about the Masri case but requested that the German government never
disclose what it had been told, even if Masri went public.").
37 See, e.g., Editorial, Supreme Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A30
(expressing disapproval of the CIA's and the U.S. judicial system's treatment of el
Masri); Editorial, Abu Ghraib Swept Under the Carpet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXII
The time has come for us, mindful of mistakes, to be real. For
those who eschew the pure to espouse the practical, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi is a useful model.38
Tough choices must be made. Trade-offs abound. With modesty,
my analysis here tracks the two major parts of O'Connor's
pragmatic opinion. First, just as Justice O'Connor agreed that the
President has the authority to designate a United States citizen as
an enemy combatant during our armed conflict with al Qaeda, 39 I
contend that the President obviously has the authority to order
40irregular renditions. But, unlike Justice O'Connor in Hamdi, I
do not require Congress's support, under an Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF) 41 or some other provision, to reach my
conclusion about executive authority. Some forms of irregular
rendition, to be clear, fall within the President's inherent powers.
Second, just as Justice O'Connor called for more process than that
proffered by the executive branch to confirm that Hamdi was
indeed an enemy combatant, I suggest that more process and
more oversight should be added to current and future transfers in
America's rendition program.43 These confirmations should
A22 (expressing disapproval of the Abu Ghraib affair and the subsequent response of the
executive branch).
38 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality).
39 Seeid. at 516-17.
40 To correspond with the public record about the rendition program and to avoid
other legal snares, I limit my contention about the president's inherent powers to non-
U.S. citizens. Applying the rendition authority to U.S. citizens would implicate due
process and other constitutional rights that may not apply to non-U.S. citizens. For now,
the practice of rendition does not seem to apply to United States citizens; Hamdi was
close, but he renounced his American citizenship at the moment of his transfer to Saudi
Arabia.
41 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (note following 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2003)) (authorizing the President to "use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons").
42 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
43 This suggestion does not contradict my views in a prior piece about irregular
rendition, A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1 (2006) (reasoning that "[i]rregular rendition is taken into lighter shades
of gray when the United States obtains reasonable assurances from the receiving country
and carries out reasonable monitoring and oversight after transfer"). That piece, in
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involve something more than the President's say so.
As to additional safeguards on irregular rendition, the
variations are endless. A new executive order or a new statute
could spell out additional process and oversight. Either way, by
order or by statute, to get to a different place on irregular
rendition, the law needs to change. One aspect of this new law
could be a special court of federal judges who, in secret session,
would review the executive branch's determination that substantial
grounds do not exist for believing that a suspect in CIA, DOD, or
other American custody will be tortured in the receiving country-
whether the recipient is the United Kingdom, Albania, or Syria.
We need a new course in American counterterrorism. Before
going full circle on my pragmatic solution for irregular rendition,
this essay lays down two parts of background on the basics of the
Hamdi opinion, and on the current framework of the law,
including the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT).45  The third part of this essay, closing a short circle,
presents high notes in a variation on a theme by Hamdi.
II. Hamdi Redux
The Hamdi court took on the task of answering two questions
concerning the Bush Administration's self-described war on
46terror. First, may the President order the detention of a United
States citizen through an enemy combatant designation? 47  (In
dealing with a United States citizen who had been seized in
Afghanistan, President Bush had opted away from the criminal
justice system, the most regular process for detaining people.)
Second, if the enemy combatant designation does apply to United
explaining the role of pre-transfer assurances and post-transfer monitoring, worked
within the current legal framework. That piece, unlike this one, tried to strip the
normative mode from the analytical mode.
44 Something similar is currently used for matters involving the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. See infra nn. 134-36 and accompanying text.
45 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat/html
[hereinafter CAT].
46 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
47 Id.
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States citizens, how much process is necessary in arriving at or
confirming this designation? 48  (The Bush Administration had
proposed the "some evidence" standard,49 which was, in essence,
the President's review of a bureaucrat's affidavit from DOD.) In
answering these two questions, three justices (in two opinions)
took pure positions while six justices (in two other opinions)
mucked about in the middle.5 °
Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas took pure positions that
went in two opposite directions.5' Justices Scalia and Stevens,
agreeing in dissent, stated that the detention of a United States
citizen was such a serious matter that, on Hamdi's facts, either the
Executive needed to comply with the criminal justice system or
the writ of habeas corpus needed to be suspended, neither of which
had occurred in that case.52  In Justice Scalia's words, "[a]bsent
suspension, however, the Executive's assertion of military
exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention
without charge." 53  Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens, in a
different case, would probably part ways when it came to the
Executive's assertion of military exigency to detain non-U.S.
citizens.54 As made clear in Rasul v. Bush, 5 Justice Scalia is less
concerned and less pure about the detention of non-U.S. citizens
48 Id.
49 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527 ("Under the some evidence standard, the focus is
exclusively on the factual basis supplied by the Executive to support its own
determination.") (citing Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 455-57 (1985) (explaining that the some evidence standard "does not require"
a "weighing of the evidence," but rather calls for assessing "whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion")).
50 Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Souter wrote separately, concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Stevens joined while Justice
Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 507.
51 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., Stevens, J., dissenting).
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, and Justice Scalia, dissenting, part ways in their view of the process that should
be afforded non-U.S. citizen detainees).
55 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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and their access to American courts.56
Justice Thomas, also in dissent in Hamdi, argued that, in a war
with al Qaeda, the courts should not override executive
judgments. 5  The President could designate Hamdi an enemy
combatant.58  No further process was required.59  In Justice
Thomas's words, "[t]his detention falls squarely within the Federal
Government's war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity
to second-guess that decision."
60
The other six justices, staying away from the black hole of
inherent presidential powers, resolved the case through statutory
interpretation. Justice O'Connor convinced Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, and Rehnquist to join her for the plurality. 62  Justice
Souter, on the other side of the statutory debate, picked up Justice
Ginsburg.63  These Justices, unlike Justices Scalia, Stevens, and
Thomas, dealt with the messiness that is present between two
strong positions that I have labeled "civil libertarian" and
"executive supremacy" camps. 64 That messiness, whether of the
56 Id. at 497-98 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[T]oday's opinion, and today's opinion alone, extends the habeas statute, for the first
time, to aliens held beyond the sovereign territory of the United States and beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of its courts. No reasons are given for this result; no
acknowledgment of its consequences made .... Today, the Court springs a trap on the
Executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the federal courts even though
it has never before been thought to be within their jurisdiction-and thus making it a
foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees."). Cf. id. at 481 (majority opinion)
("Considering that the statute draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in
federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical
coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee's citizenship. Aliens held at
the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts'
authority under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.").
57 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 509 (majority opinion); id. at 539 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
62 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
63 Id. at 539.
64 Id. at 531 ("Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance
to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our
calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege
that is American citizenship.") (majority opinion); see also id. at 545 ("The defining
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
O'Connor or Souter variety, resulted from their imperfect quest for
middle ground.
To me, the debate between O'Connor and Souter parallels the
reasonable debate that can exist between political parties, among
members of the legal academy, and among members of the public
about the appropriate balance between individual liberty and group
security in constructing our counterterrorism strategy. As New
Age existentialists, Justices O'Connor and Souter are both
engaged in their circumstances. They have not retreated to
philosophical ivory towers.
In my view, the O'Connor approach seems most reasonable in
resolving difficult issues in national security, particularly those
related to irregular rendition. When push comes to shove, she
becomes deferential toward the executive branch. Even so, the
Souter approach, straddled between O'Connor and Scalia/Stevens,
is reasonable in expecting Congress to be active and specific on
government actions that result in deprivations of individual liberty.
Souter sees the courts as a counterweight to the hydraulic
pressures that the executive branch tends to exert in trying to make
us all safe. In short, the difference between O'Connor and Souter
in Hamdi should be measured in degrees, not in kind.
While neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Souter specifically
framed the Hamdi argument within the three categories of Justice
Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,65 that analytical framework helps explain their different
conclusions. Justice O'Connor ended up in Jackson's first
character of American constitutional government is its constant tension between security
and liberty, serving both by partial helpings of each.") (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
concurring opinion).
65 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (reasoning that "(1) [w]hen the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ... (2)
[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain ... [and] (3) [w]hen the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter.").
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category, the strongest for the President.66 She concluded that the
AUMF, passed days after 9/11, was specific enough to satisfy the
Non-Detention Act67 and to give the President the authority to
detain a United States citizen as an enemy combatant.68 She saw
detention as a "fundamental incident" of an armed conflict,
neutralizing the danger that the enemyX combatant could return to
battle to hurt or kill American forces. 9 Because American forces
were still operating in Afghanistan at the time of the Hamdi
decision, she believed the armed conflict with al Qaeda and the
Taliban was still in effect.7° Relying on Ex parte Quirin,7' she
noted that the Court's precedent did not preclude American
citizens from being held as an enemy combatant.72 Overall, those
were strong notes in favor of the executive branch.73
By contrast, Justice Souter did not believe that the AUMF was
specific enough to satisfy the Non-Detention Act, which had been
passed to avoid a repetition of the round-up of American citizens,
an infamous experience for Japanese-Americans (and Japanese
74aliens) during the Second World War. Justice Souter ended up
in Jackson's third category, the weakest for the President.75  The
Non-Detention Act, Souter argued, required something much more
76specific. A stronger check on the executive branch was needed:
66 Id. at 635.
67 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2002).
68 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (majority opinion).
69 Id. at 519 ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield
is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary and
appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the
narrow circumstances considered here.") (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 521.
71 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
72 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 ("There is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own
citizens as an enemy combatant .... [In Ex parte Quirin,] [w]e held that '[c]itizens who
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid,
guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of... the law of war."').
73 Id. at 517 ("[W]e agree with the Government's ... position, that Congress has in
fact authorized Hamdi's detention, through the AUMF.").
74 See id. at 547 (Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
75 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637.
76 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring opinion).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
"[flor reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to
victory. ' 77
Not all of Justice O'Connor's notes were in favor of the
executive branch, though. She made clear, in a rhetorical flourish
that has been quoted many times, that a state of war did not give
the President a "blank check" 78 when it came to the rights of
American citizens.79 Further, she acknowledged that the enemy
combatant model, which she accepted for Hamdi, could break
down in other cases because the conflict with international
terrorism does not have traditional battle lines or a clear ending.
80
A conflict between a state and non-state actors, after all, cannot
conclude by the same sort of peace treaty that ended the conflict
during the Second World War between the United States and
Japan. s t In a ghost war, many years can go by without an obvious
attack. Eight years went by, for instance, between al Qaeda's first
attack on the World Trade Center and the second attack that did
the job.82
In the Hamdi opinion, Justice O'Connor's pragmatism was
most evident when she turned to the second question, namely, how
much process Hamdi deserved to contest the enemy combatant
designation. 83  Relying on the three-part balancing test from
77 Id.
78 Id. at 536 (majority opinion) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 587).
79 Id
8o Id. at 521 ("[W]e agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation
is not authorized .... If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved
in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of 'necessary
and appropriate force,' and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.").
81 Id. at 520 ("We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the 'war on
terror,' although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government
concedes, 'given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a
formal cease-fire agreement."').
82 See Anemona Hartocollis, Blame for 1993 Attack on Center Is Still at Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/nyregion/10wtc.html?_rd l &scp = l &sq=1993+attac
k+on+World+Trade+Center&stnyt&oref-slogin.
83 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525.
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Mathews v. Eldridge,84 a case that concerned cutting off disability
payments from the Social Security Administration, she left it to
the lower courts to find a reasonable ground for Hamdi.85
Hamdi's interest was to be free of a mistaken or unreasonable
detention.86 The government's interest, on the other hand, was "in
ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during
a war do not return to battle against the United States."
87
In deciding how much process was necessary to decide
between these conflicting interests, Justice O'Connor ruled out the
extremes. 88  The "some evidence" standard proffered by the
Government was not enough.89 As Justice O'Connor described,
"[a]side from unspecified 'screening' processes, and military
interrogations in which the Government suggests Hamdi could
have contested his classification, Hamdi has received no
process." 90  That was far from the optimal balance. Justice
O'Connor continued, "[a]ny process in which the Executive's
factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed
correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to
demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short."
91
At the other end of the range, a full-blown trial was not
84 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews Court reasoned that due process
determinations depend on weighing three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
85 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539.
86 Id. at 530.
87 Id. at 531.
88 Id. at 532-33 ("[W]e believe that neither the process proposed by the
Government nor the process apparently envisioned by the District Court below strikes
the proper constituional balance when a United States citizen is detained in the United
States as an enemy combatant.").
89 Id. at 537.
90 Id.
91 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
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necessary.92 To allow the government to demonstrate that Hamdi
was an enemy combatant, Justice O'Connor would consider
hearsay 93 and a burden in favor of the government's evidence,
94
two considerations that would be unacceptable in a normal
criminal trial.95  Those considerations aside, the holding of the
case was "that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker." 96  In so holding, Justice O'Connor made clear
that the civilian courts are not the only means of dispensing due
process. 97  Even though she had not given the government
everything it sought, she did offer some consolation that the
government could stay out of civilian courts: "There remains the
possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by
an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal."
Implicit in Justice O'Connor's approach in Hamdi is that the
government does not need to provide due process before the
person's liberty interests have been affected. 99 In other words, the
process to which Hamdi was entitled would occur after he was
detained as an enemy combatant.' 00  It would have been
impractical to the point of absurdity to expect due process to be
provided upon his immediate capture on the battlefield in
Afghanistan.
All in all, Hamdi and the government were left with no clear
victor. After Hamdi was decided, the government, rather than sort
92 Id. at 533 ("[T]he exigencies of the circumstances that, aside from these core
elements, enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.").
93 Id. at 533-34 ("Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most
reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.").
94 Id. at 534.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 533.
97 See generally id. at 538.
98 Id. at 538.
99 Id. at 533.
100 Id.
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out the details through another round in the courts, negotiated a
deal with the alleged enemy combatant. 101  The Americans
released Hamdi in exchange for his promise to renounce his
American citizenship and to stay away from the battle. 1° 2  In
addition, the Saudi government promised to keep tabs on him.' 0 3
Today, Hamdi is a relatively free man, back in Saudi Arabia. His
case must be remembered because within the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdi lies a key to unlocking many of the
conundrums to irregular rendition.
III. Legal References
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 10 4
is a primary reference for analyzing the legality of rendition under
American law. 10 5 Article Three of the CAT states that a signatory
should not "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."' 0 6 For this
10, See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004,
at A02.
102 Press Release, Mark Corallo, supra note 23.
103 See Joel Brinkley, Deportation Delayed for 'Enemy Combatant,' N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2004, at A13, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/01/politics/01 hamdi.html?oref-login&oref-login&pag
ewanted=print&position ("Saudi officials, clearly irritated, said they found the
monitoring provision of Mr. Hamdi's release agreement unreasonable. They also noted
that the supervision duties, which entail ensuring that Mr. Hamdi does not leave the
country for five years, were imposed upon Saudi Arabia even though no Saudi officials
were involved in the negotiations."). See also Yaser Esam Hamdi v. Donald Rumsfeld
Settlement Agreement (Sep. 17, 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagrmnt.html (detailing the final
settlement agreement negotiated between the U.S. government and Hamdi).
104 CAT, supra note 45.
105 Critics of irregular rendition also draw on the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/a-ccpr.htm.
Article 7 of the ICCPR states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." Because the ICCPR is less specific than the
CAT on rendition and because it is less likely the ICCPR has become part of American
law, I focus on the CAT.
106 CAT, supra note 45, at art. 3.
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provision to make sense, fixed definitions (or reasonably fixed
definitions) of two terms, "substantial grounds" and "torture," are
necessary.
When the United States Senate ratified the CAT in 1990, it
identified the ambiguity latent to Article Three. To reduce the
ambiguity, the Senate ratified the CAT on the understanding that
substantial grounds means that it is "more likely than not" that the
person will be tortured in the receiving country.' 7 By a cross-
reference, the Senate's new definition created the illusion of
mathematical certainty, connecting rendition to the fifty-one
percent standard by which civil cases are decided in the United
States. 1
08
As to the second term, defining "torture" involves the same
sort of ambiguities and difficulties as defining "substantial
grounds." Moreover, for most people, the word "torture" conjures
up many more images than the sterile, legalistic phrase
"substantial grounds." Thus people become more emotional when
talking about "torture" than when talking about "substantial
grounds."
Some things are clearly torture. Chopping off a person's
fingers to extract information or to inflict pain is an example.
Some things are clearly not torture. Providing a wholesome and
tasty meal-salmon, broccoli and rice-on a silver platter is an
example. Between the extremes, there is much uncertainty and
much room for disagreement.
The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), in
providing advice to the CIA about acceptable interrogation tactics,
interpreted the torture statute 1°9 which Congress had adopted as
107 Executive Session, 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01, S17486 (1990) ("That the
United States understands the phrase, 'where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,' as used in Article 3 of the
[CAT], to mean 'if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured."').
108 See, e.g., Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the
"more likely than not" standard for withholding removal of an alien to require a showing
of 'at least a 51% chance of religious and political persecution' upon return"); Kahn v.
Elwood, 232 F.Supp.2d 344, 351 n. 5 (M.D.Pa., 2002) (considering the likelihood that an
alien seeking asylum would be tortured upon return to his home country, "[a] more likely
than not standard means fifty-one percent or higher. Thus, Petitioner could have failed to
prove that he was more likely than not going to face torture upon his return to Pakistan
and still have shown that there was a '50-50 chance."').
109 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
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part of the process of putting the CAT into effect under American
law." O OLC's memo, dated August 1, 2002, later leaked to the
public and then retracted, was criticized for being too stingy in its
definition of torture. 11  In one part of the memo, torture was
equated with the pain experienced from organ failure or death." 1
2
Even though OLC later retracted its definition of torture in
December of 2004,' 13 the interpretative task still remains for so
many aspects of interrogation. The following questions remain:
(1) does the Military Commissions Act," supplemented by
President Bush's Executive Order," 5 permit sensory deprivation
on suspects in CIA control?; (2) is the Justice Department
reasonable in viewing torture in a separate category as an extreme
form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment?; 116 (3) is sleep
deprivation torture?; as well as many, many others. Even for those
who strive to be objective and not just give the answers clients
want to hear, these are most difficult questions.
Similarly, despite OLC's retraction, not all of the Bush
Administration's extreme arguments about rendition have been put
to rest. Professor John Yoo has put forward a two-part argument
I10 See generally Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/cheney/torture-memo-aug2002.pdf [hereinafter Torture Memo].
II See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re: Legal
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (extending the previous legal standard
of "severe" pain under the statute beyond "'excruciating or agonizing' pain" or "pain
'equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily functions, even death."') [hereinafter Retraction Memo].
112 Torture Memo, supra note 110 ("We conclude that for an act to constitute torture
as defined in Section 2340, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain
amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.").
113 See generally Retraction Memo, supra note 111.
114 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/PL- 109-366.pdf.
"15 Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070720-4.html (entitled
"Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program
of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency").
116 See Retraction Memo, supra note 111.
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that Article Three of the CAT does not apply to the CIA's
renditions.1 17 First, assuming that the CAT is a not a self-
executing treaty, the Administration's defenders note that it is
unclear whether the CIA, in response to legislation in 1998,118
adopted any regulations to adopt the Article Three standard.1 19
For example, the State Department's legal advisor, John Bellinger,
when referring to the Article Three standard for DOD transfers
from Guantanamo, is careful to stay neutral about CIA
practices.' 20 Second, inferring from a Supreme Court decision that
limited the reach of the Refugee Convention,121 theAdministration's defenders argue that, for purposes of American
117 John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1227-32
(2004).
118 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §
2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822-23. The Act's statement regarding the "United States
Policy with Respect to the Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to
Torture" tracks the CAT and adds the phrase "regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States." Id. This additional phrase expresses an extra-
territorial intent. Id.
119 The Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, and the State
Department then enacted regulations to apply Article Three standards in these divisions.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18, §§ 1208.16-18 (2007); 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1-.4 (2007); David
Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46
VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 605 (2006). To the degree the CIA has adopted these standards, the
information remains classified. Radsan, supra note 43, at 21.
120 John Bellinger, Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, The United States'
Response to the Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture (May 6, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68562.htm.
121 See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). The Court held
that:
The text of Article 33 [of the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees] thus fits with [the] understanding that
"'expulsion' would refer to a 'refugee already admitted into a
country' and that 'return' would refer to a 'refugee already within
the territory but not yet resident there.' Thus, the Protocol was not
intended to govern parties' conduct outside of their national borders."
Id. at 182 (quoting Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 840 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (footnotes omitted)). See also id. at 179-80 ("If Article 33.1 applied
extraterritorially, therefore, Article 33.2 would create an absurd anomaly: Dangerous
aliens on the high seas would be entitled to the benefits of 33.1 while those residing in
the country that sought to expel them would not. It is more reasonable to assume that the
coverage of 33.2 was limited to those already in the country because it was understood
that 33.1 obligated the signatory state only with respect to aliens within its territory.").
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law, the CAT does not reach beyond American territory.'22 Thus,
the CAT applies only to transfers from within U.S. territory to
third countries and not to transfers between two points outside
U.S. territory. 123 It is the latter category, to be sure, that is most
relevant to CIA renditions. With that said, it is difficult to gauge
how much support John Yoo has for such arguments about
executive power. Outside the Administration, Professor Yoo
seems to be in the minority.
124
There is a separate argument that, even if Article Three is part
of American law, the president can invoke his commander-in-chief
powers to override the CAT on irregular renditions that are
necessary to national security. 125  John Yoo, and his colleague
David Addington from the Office of the Vice President, have
pushed this argument for the President.126 Just as President Bush's
122 See Yoo, supra note 117, at 1229 ("[T]he [CAT] is generally inapplicable to
transfers effected in the context of the current armed conflict because it has no
extraterritorial effect (except in the case of extradition) and, hence, cannot apply to al
Qaeda and Taliban prisoners detained outside of U.S. territory at Guantanamo Bay or in
Afghanistan.").
123 See id.
124 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti:
Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 82 (1995) ("Narrow
territorial interpretation of human rights treaties is anathema to the basic idea of human
rights, which is to ensure that a state should respect human rights of persons over whom
it exercises jurisdiction."); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:
Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1368 (2007)
("Given the wording of article 3's directive-'[n]o State Party shall'-the most ordinary
meaning would be that a state party may not, regardless of where it is acting, 'expel,
return (refouler), or extradite a person' who is in its custody or control .... In light of
the object and purpose of the treaty, this reading is not only the best one, it is also in line
with the rules that have developed concerning extraterritorial application of human rights
treaties generally."); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 143 (2006) (reasoning that because
drafters intended Article 3 of the CAT to be broader in scope than Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention, the "history of the [CAT] clarifies that the drafters intended Article
3 to have extraterritorial effect") (referencing J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS,
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 125 (1988)).
125 See Torture Memo, supra note 110.
126 See generally John Yoo, Memorandum Opinion For the Deputy Counsel to the
President: The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, Sep. 25, 2001,
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm.
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lawyers have compared the interrogation of suspected terrorists to
"tactical decisions" on the battlefield, 127 they may argue that the
transfer of suspected terrorists is a core executive power upon
which Congress may not intrude. Others will dispute the analogy.
So much depends on the specific facts, such as whether a transfer
involves the mastermind of the 9/11 plots or whether it involves a
person who merely drove Taliban soldiers in a rusty truck from
one Afghan village to another. In other words, Khaled Sheikh
Mohammed poses a greater threat to American national security
than Salim Hamdan does.
Those who believe in a significant overlap between the
Executive and Congress on war powers and foreign policy powers,
what Professor Corwin coined the "invitation to struggle,"128 will
tend to reject arguments about an executive override. Further, at
the factual level, they will remind us that there is a significant
difference between getting involved in a general's movement of
tanks during a battle (an area in which Congress may not
intrude) 129 and the movement of human beings from one
jurisdiction to another (an area in which Congress seems invited to
intrude). Yet, because the courts use the political question
doctrine and other techniques to avoid becoming ensnared in such
arguments, 130 the debate about executive power continues between
the branches of government as well as between the law professors.
IV. The Hamdi Resolution
Justice O'Connor's mindset, as described, is to work toward
the middle between extreme arguments, whether those arguments
127 See Torture Memo, supra note 110 (arguing that the President's commander-in-
chief power encompasses interrogation).
128 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984 201
(Randall W. Bland et al., eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) ("All of which amounts to saying that
the Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting
the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy.").
129 See id. at 263 (discussing the President's power under the "Commander-in-
Chief' clause of the Constitution).
130 See id. at 206-7 (noting that based on the political question doctrine "the Court
has subsequently held . . . that it must accept as final and binding on itself the
determinations of one or other or both of 'the political departments,' with respect" to
questions on foreign affairs).
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are for executive power or for civil liberties. 131 Hers is a hybrid
approach. When she dealt with the designation of a United States
citizen as an enemy combatant, she straddled systems of civilian
and military justice.' 32  Ever practical, she would advise us to
adopt a similar solution for irregular rendition.
The urgency in detaining an enemy combatant on the
battlefield differs from the urgency the government experiences in
an irregular rendition. In the rendition context, the government
likely has had time to take the person away from the battlefield,
somewhere safer in American custody. Indeed, the rendition may
come long after the enemy combatant designation. 133 For those
reasons, if the Fifth Amendment applies, the suspected terrorist
can make a much stronger case for due process before he is
transferred to another jurisdiction. Process after he is transferred
does not make sense because it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to take him back into American custody if the process
later determines that he should not have been transferred.
Independent review is crucial to providing fairness on
renditions. This essential independence can come from a special
court. Whether the special court for irregular renditions comes
into existence by executive order or by statute, its creators should
be mindful of "standing" and the requirements of a "case or
controversy." In all, we must continue to comply with the
Constitution.
The constitutional requirements, however, are not
insurmountable. In a different context-related to searches and
electronic surveillance within the United States to gather foreign
intelligence-the Constitution does not get in the way of a
reasonable arrangement. Under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 134 federal judges, appointed by
131 See supra text accompanying notes 18-44 (explaining Justice O'Connor's
decision and reasoning in Hamdi).
132 See supra nn. 34-42 and accompanying text.
133 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (discussing how
designating someone as an enemy combatant often occurs during exigent circumstances
during "ongoing military conflict"). Since enemy combatant classification can occur
quickly in order to detain someone, rendition may not happen until that enemy
combatant status is argued, as in Hamdi. See id.
134 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,(BBRI2.2.2(a)) Pub. L. No. 95-
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
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the Chief Justice, review ex parte applications from the
government for searches and electronic surveillance. 35 Thus,
FISA is the model for anyone who would like to create a special
court to handle difficult matters of national security. Indeed, FISA
is the common reference for those who p ropose to try terrorists by
a blend of civilian and military justice.
Applying Hamdi's logic to rendition, the soon-to-be-
transferred person should have an opportunity to be heard in front
of a neutral decision-maker before his or her rendition occurs.
Basic due process can thus be satisfied by including other
participants via the special court. At a minimum, the prisoner
should be allowed to present facts to the special court and to
attempt to rebut facts which the government has presented. The
rest is details.
A. A Totality of Circumstances
Whatever the details to the rendition process, the special court
should consider several factors in deciding whether it is more
likely than not (defined as a fifty-one percent chance) 137 that a
prisoner will be tortured upon transfer to a third country. While
Article Three of the CAT does not offer many specifics, it does
135 See id. § 1805.
136 See James Nicholas Boeving, The Right To Be Present Before Military
Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting National Security in an Age of Classified
Information, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 463, 525 (2007) ("[T]here may be other
avenues that Congress could pursue [in terrorism prosecution], such as increasing the
responsibility given to the FISA court to allow it to protect such information and
possibly conduct trials where such information is involved."); Amos N. Guiora, Where
Are Terrorists To Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected
Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 805, 834 (2007) (discussing the possibility of amending
FISA to allow terrorist suspects to be tried before the FISA court); A. John Radsan, A
Better Model for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1227, 1244-46
(2006) (describing the FISA experience as a model for the detention and interrogation of
suspected terrorists); Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, Op-Ed The Terrorists' Court,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/1 I/opinion/1 lkatyal.html (suggesting Congress
establish a "national security court" and pull judges from FISA courts). See also ERIC A.
POSNER & ADRIEN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 217-248 (2006) (discussing how due process has, and should be, applied to
suspected terrorists).
137 See supra text accompanying note 48.
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state that "all relevant considerations" should be taken "into
account."'1 38  That means the executive branch-or the special
court in the suggested new approach-should do more than flip a
coin to reach its decision. Of particular importance, according to
the CAT, is "a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights" in the receiving country. 39 In other
words, the special court should consider the receiving country's
general reputation for protecting human rights. That reputation
relates to respect for the rule of law and, when focusing on
detention, how people are treated in prisons and other facilities
that restrict individual liberty.
The analysis of rendition must dig down into specifics. To the
extent facts are available about the receiving country, the special
court could distinguish between the treatment of common
criminals and the treatment of those who are accused of links to
terrorism. The experience with terrorists is most relevant because,
since September 11 th, many renditions from American custody
(probably most of those from CIA custody) involve people who
are accused of being terrorists. 140
In determining the human rights record for the receiving
country, several factors will be useful to the special court. First,
the U.S. State Department, as part of an annual report, describes
the human rights practices of many countries.' The State
Department, which uses this reporting to prod improvements,
142
does not seem to have a total bias toward minimizing human rights
abuses in other countries.1 43 Further, the State Department draws
138 CAT, supra note 45, at art. 3(2).
139 Id.
140 Mary Crane, U.S. Treatment of Terror Suspects and U.S.-E.U. Relations,
Council on Foreign Relations, (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9350.
"Press reports indicate the United States has captured more than 100 terrorism suspects
since 9/11 and rendered them to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and
other nations." Id.
141 These reports are available for browsing through the State Department's website
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
142 See Condoleezza Rice, Preface: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -
2006, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78715.htm (BBR 18.2.3)
("The world's democracies must defend the defenders [of human rights]. That is one of
the primary missions of... the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2006.").
143 But cf Human Rights First, Press Release, Human Rights Group Revives
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on other sources, inside and outside the government, to present an
objective assessment of human rights conditions in other
countries. 144  As a result, American courts, in making decisions
about transfers from the immigration context, consider State
Department reports to be authoritative-but not definitive.
145
Those reports help regular courts determine whether, consistent
with American law, non-U.S. citizens can be deported or removed
to other countries. 146
Second, human rights organizations issue reports about the
human rights practices in many countries. Those reports are also
treated with respect. 147 They may not have an official stamp, but
they are much higher in terms of credibility than the musings of
the typical blog. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights
First, to name just a few, have also written pieces against the
United States practice of irregular rendition since 9/11.14 As they
make clear, they are trying to influence policy. For this reason,
Critique of State Department Annual Report and Recommends Changes to Address
Backsliding in Objectivity, Oct. 17, 2003,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2003_alerts/1017.htm (noting that the 2006
report tended to ignore human rights violations done in the name of counter-terrorism).
"The fairness and objectivity of much of the State Department's reports makes all the
more glaring the serious omissions and distortions in sections on some key allies in the
U.S.-led 'war on terrorism."' Id.
144 See Overview and Acknowledgments, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices - 2007, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights (March 11, 2008),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100463.htm (stating that the embassies collect
this information from "government officials, jurists, armed forces sources, journalists,
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists").
145 See Tian-Yong Chen v. U.S. I.N.S, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[Courts]
should be careful not to place excessive reliance on [the Department of State Country
Reports] .... Such State Department reports.. .often provide a useful and informative
overview of conditions in [a country] .... But their observations do not automatically
discredit contrary evidence .... and they are not binding [on the court].").
146 See id. (using a State Department report to help decide whether the plaintiff
should be deported).
147 See M.A. v. U.S. I.N.S, 899 F.2d 304, 313 n.6, 323 n.9 (4th Cir. 1990)
(acknowledging that reports by human rights organizations are treated with respect by
courts).
148 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO TORTURE
AND 'DISAPPEARANCE' (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510512006; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE
ISSUE, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/etn/elect08/issue.aspx.
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their reports and publications may, at times, be considered as
much the products of persuasive advocates as the neutral
purveyors of fact on any particular rendition. The human rights
community, which errs away from any possibility of abuse, tends
toward the formal process of rendition known as extradition. 1
49
Third, on the rendition decision, books and articles may
supplement the governmental and non-governmental reports about
human rights practices. Some of these books are easily found in
the world history and political science sections in public libraries.
Further, depending on the circumstances, the receiving country
may have an independent press that exposes government
150misconduct. No matter the circumstances, the American media,
especially the elite newspapers, do serve a purpose in explaining
what occurs in places like Serbia, Somalia, and the Sudan. These
sources, while not absolute, will assist the special court in
determining the relative truth on the ground.
One advantage to all three sets of sources (country reports,
NGO reports, and books and articles) is that they are not
classified. For this reason, our government cannot reasonably
push for a closed or a streamlined process on a rendition because
of a need to protect these sources. Unlike assurances from the
receiving country or post-transfer monitoring of the prisoner, as
discussed below, almost everything about human rights conditions
can be discussed in the special court's open session. Once those
facts are in, the prisoner's counsel and the government's counsel
can try to shape the special court's conclusions. In the classic
adversarial style of the United States legal system, the sifting and
sorting of points and counter-points can lead the advocates to
disparate arguments. The special court, after hearing the
arguments, is free to choose those conclusions that make most
sense.
Not only does the court need to hear about the receiving
country, it needs to hear about the prisoner. The legality of
irregular rendition, in the end, is fact-based, and thus must be a
specific evaluation of the particular case at hand. The risk is not
torture in the abstract; the risk is that a particular prisoner will be
149 See id. at 31-33 (recommending the U.S. end its rendition program).
150 See, e.g., The Syrian Human Rights Committee, http://www.shrc.org (publishing
articles about the progress of and violations of human rights in Syria).
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tortured upon transfer. 51 Therefore, although a country such as
Syria may have a very poor human rights record, 152 it is possible,
even if unlikely, that a prisoner will not be tortured there. The
past does not always doom the future. Conversely, it is possible
that a prisoner will end up being tortured in a country that has
close to a perfect human rights record. A rosy past in Finland does
not always bloom for the future.
To reach a conclusion about a specific prisoner going to a
specific country, the special court needs to hear details about the
prisoner's experiences, if any, in the receiving country. The
prisoner may have already fled persecution in that country. The
prisoner may have relatives in that country who are being treated
unfairly. The prisoner may have already been tortured there. To
provide these facts, the prisoner himself is an important source.
He may be able to corroborate his version with statements from
other witnesses and with a written record. Similarly, the United
States government may offer contrary evidence. In all, working
from the same facts, the prisoner has an interest in accentuating
the risk while the government has an interest in minimizing it.
Back and forth, the special court will benefit from vigorous
advocacy on both sides.
One disparity not easily resolved between the prisoner and the
government is their access to witnesses and documents. Here, the
government has a strong advantage. The government has formal
and informal means of securing witnesses, along with a budget to
pay for their expenses. To even the playing field on witnesses, the
prisoner could be given some sort of subpoena power. If this is
done, the government might then be asked to assist the prisoner in
making witnesses available from foreign jurisdictions.
Alternatively, the witnesses might testify through telephone or
video links. These issues, like much else in the Hamdi
intermediate zone, are not easily resolved on irregular rendition.
Unlike Justice O'Connor, however, we cannot remand the case to
the lower courts to sort out the details. Using Mathews v. Eldridge
as our guide, the best we can do with each proposal for additional
151 Because the United States is a signatory to the CAT, at least as a matter of
policy, it should not transfer a person to a country where he will be tortured. CAT, supra
note 45, at art. 3.
152 See generally Syrian Human Rights Committee, supra note 150.
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process is a cost-benefit analysis.1
53
To parse the issue of access to counsel, the special court
should draw on experiences from criminal cases that have
involved classified information-although the stakes in an
irregular rendition are not exactly the same as those in a criminal
trial. 154  The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen
connected to the 9/11 plot, provides a recent example of how a
court resolved a prisoner's access to witnesses as well as the
government's right to protect its intelligence sources and methods
by continuing to interrogate high-level detainees in secret
locations. 1
55
1. Assurances
Assurances from the receiving country that the prisoner will be
treated fairly upon transfer are another important factor in
renditions.'15  Those assurances could be oral or in writing. They
could come from the head of state, the foreign minister, the head
of the security service, or from lower level officials. The
assurances could be general or, through an annex, could list a
number of prohibited practices.
Whatever the form of the assurances, many in the human
rights community have viewed them as empty promises. 157 Many
commentators assert that assurances are a thin cover for American
officials who put their heads in the sand to ignore obvious signs of
153 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 42 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
154 The government's goal in a criminal case is a conviction plus a sentence that
may be as extreme as the death penalty. Irregular rendition, on the other hand, may seek
something other than detention; it may suit the American authorities simply to be rid of
the prisoner. In any event, the often stated purpose of irregular rendition is to be able to
conduct an aggressive interrogation. By contrast, in the criminal justice system, the
gathering of information, if any, usually occurs in exchange for a lesser plea or a lighter
sentence.
155 United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Jerry Markon
and Timothy Dwyer, Jurors Reject Death Penalty for Moussaoui, WASH. POST, May 4,
2006, at Al (describing the outcome in Moussaoui's trial).
156 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (C)(2) (2008) (requiring that before removing an alien, the
Attorney General has to determine if the assurances are "sufficiently reliable").
157 See Human Rights Watch, Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard
Against Torture (vol. 17, no. 4(D), Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/eca0405.pdf
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torture.1 58  Further, statements from the former head of the
Counterterrorism Center 159 and from the former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency 160 demonstrate that there is more of a
focus on the war on terror and less of a focus on the legality of
their actions.
Unlike those in the human rights community who are most
critical of all CIA practices, and unlike CIA officials who are
cavalier in their public comments, I sincerely believe that
assurances can make a difference on the legality of a particular
transfer. As the State Department's legal advisor has made clear,
assurances are a significant part of the process when prisoners are
transferred from Guantanamo to other countries.' 6 1 So what works
in Guantanamo should work in other places.
At Guantanamo and elsewhere, assurances do not matter that
much at the extremes. Assurances from Syrian officials will
probably not tilt the balance toward legality for a transfer to Syria,
because of its reputation for torture. 162  And assurances from
Finland are probably not necessary. But on a close call, when the
chances of torture hover around fifty percent, the assurances may
make a difference. All other things being equal, written
assurances are worth more than oral ones, and multiple layers of
assurances from diplomats, spooks, and jailors hold more value
158 See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human
Rights and Global Justice, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law
Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions," at 90 (2005), available at
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf (discussing how government officials
sometimes take the assurances as truth without further investigation); Human Rights
Watch, "Empty Promises: "Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture, at 16,
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/diplomaticO4O4.pdf (discussing Maher
Arar's case, where he was transferred to Syria based on its assurances and despite
common knowledge of consistent human rights violations).
159 Investigation of September 11 Failures; Hearing Before a Joint Session of the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Cofer
Black, Dir. of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center) ("There was 'before' 9/11 and
'after' 9/11. After 9/11, the gloves came off."), available at 2002 WL 31151504.
160 Porter Goss, former Director of the CIA, acknowledged that the United States
has only a limited capacity to ensure that detainees will be treated humanely. Douglas
Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at Al. He stated, "[bjut of course once they're out of our control,
there's only so much we can do." Id.
161 See Guiora, supra note 136.
162 See id.
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than a single signature.
The special court's consideration of assurances, however, may
need to be ex parte. Receiving countries may be less likely to
make any assurances to American officials if they are going to be
shared with people outside a small group in the executive branch.
To assuage the concerns of foreign countries that cooperate with
the United States in combating terrorism, it will be easier for
American officials if they can truthfully say that the details of the
assurances will only be shared with the special court, not with the
prisoner himself or with his counsel.
The ex parte aspect to the process, to be sure, does undermine
full advocacy from both sides on a rendition decision. Yet, in
other civil and criminal cases, the courts have done justice even
though some parts of the process do not involve both parties. On
Freedom of Information Act163 cases, for example, in the civil
setting, the executive branch often goes to court, ex parte, to
explain the risks of disclosing classified information. Similarly,
under the Classified Information Procedures Act, 164 prosecutors
are allowed to make ex parte presentations in criminal cases.
Therefore, having an ex parte aspect to the irregular rendition
process does not equate with injustice. The Hamdi model, to
repeat, accepts the messiness of drawing lines in the gray. A full-
blown model of due process is not practical on all national security
decisions.
2. Post-Transfer Monitoring
A factor related to assurances is post-transfer monitoring. This
is a dynamic factor, a future possibility that the special court
should consider in making a present decision about rendition. All
other things being equal, the balance tilts toward legality if the
receiving country agrees to visits with the prisoner after the
transfer. Unescorted visits mean more than escorted ones. And
visits by third-parties, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, mean more than visits by American officials because
the Red Cross does not have a vested interest in concluding that
163 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007).
164 Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 202 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. App. 3).
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the transfer did not lead to torture.1 65
Post-transfer visits, like assurances of fair treatment before
transfer, do not guarantee that the prisoner will be safe from
torture. Nothing can. It is possible for the prisoner to be tortured
in a way that does not leave obvious marks or in a way that causes
him not to mention the torture to the Red Cross representatives.
It is not pleasant to imagine all the possibilities. As an
extreme example, imagine if the prisoner has been tortured by
Syrian interrogators who pretended to be Red Cross officials. As a
consequence, the prisoner may not trust anyone. The sad truth is
that the prisoner can become completely disoriented and
manipulated. This is not to condone such mistreatment. This is to
accept, despite all the checks, all the controls, and all the process,
that evil things continue to be done to human beings. The Hamdi
model, while not giving up on ideals, is realistic about the limits of
law.
The United States, having weighed all the relevant factors
under the CAT, may transfer a prisoner to a third country under
the law, 166 but its responsibilities should not end there. After
transfer, if the United States obtains credible information, whether
through open or secret sources, that the prisoner has been
mistreated, it should insist that the mistreatment stop. It should
encourage transfer of the prisoner back to the United States or to a
country with a better human rights record.
Despite any prior assurances, if the United States has a bad
experience with a country- particularly a "close call" that results
in torture-that may be enough, by itself, to take the country off
the list for possible renditions. The bad experience in the gray, so
to speak, will taint the country into the black for the near future.
The Hamdi approach, however, is not categorical. Even countries
like Syria and Egypt, which have very poor human rights records,
might do enough over the long-term for reasonable practitioners of
165 See A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 54 (2006) (citing Human Rights Watch, "Empty Promises:" Diplomatic
Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture, at 4, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/
diplomatic04O4.pdf).
166 See supra Part III (discussing the legality of renditions).
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rendition to suspend disbelief about the risks of torture."' But
emerging from the black will not be easy; the time it takes to clean
up a country's record will be measured in years, not days.
B. Specific Procedures
The lesson from Hamdi is that a fair process on irregular
rendition does not need to involve a full civilian trial in which all
the rules of evidence apply. Hamdi, in so many words, states that
the proper criminal trial is not the only way to provide justice in
the United States. 168  Hearsay, to protect some legitimate
government secrets, might be permitted in deciding on irregular
renditions. 169 Shifting the burden of proof - on more likely than
not - from the government to the prisoner might also be
permitted. 170  Some of the purity and protections of traditional
models will, necessarily, be left behind. 17 1 The purists, those who
always espouse the commander-in-chief override and those who
always prefer the criminal justice model, may not be pleased.
Alas, Hamdi is a place for pragmatists, caught between two poles.
Further, Hamdi identified but did not resolve the difficult issue
of access to counsel. 172  In Hamdi's case, concerning the
designation of a United States citizen as an enemy combatant, the
government did not permit him access to counsel for many
months. 173  Whether or not he had a right to counsel from the
beginning of his detention, Justice O'Connor said it was clear he
had a right to counsel going forward in the case.' 74 Such counsel
would help determine whether Hamdi fell within the enemy
combatant category or not.
75
167 See generally State Department Reports, supra note 141.
168 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
169 Id. at 533.
170 Id. at 575.
171 See generally id. at 533 (discussing the exigency that makes full protections
impractical).
172 Id. at 539.
173 Hamdi had been allowed limited access to counsel by the time his case arrived at
the Supreme Court. Id.
174 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539.
175 See id.
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On irregular rendition, what role, if any, is there for counsel?
The traditional criminal justice model would push for counsel. 176
The executive power camp, on the other hand, would see counsel
as an unnecessary interference. 177  Those who see the issue
through the Hamdi lens will continue to doubt themselves. In
answering such questions, it is clear that the more we seek process
the more we will lean toward including counsel for the suspect.
What is not so clear, however, is how much the issue in a rendition
case (whether the prisoner will be tortured in a third country)
equates with the issue in a criminal case (say, whether the
defendant committed the bank robbery or transferred funds with
"an intent to defraud"). To some, the rendition case seems more
about facts and less about the application of facts to legal
standards. But even the fact/law duality, like so many other
dualities in the law, can be blurred.
In the mush that is Mathews v. Eldridge,178 the opposing
interests can be identified and distinguished on a rendition. The
prisoner does not want a process that incorrectly leads to his
transfer. If a mistake is made against him, he may be tortured or
killed in the receiving country. That is as distressing as the Hamdi
fear of a mistaken designation which leads to indefinite detention
in a United States facility. By contrast, the State's interest is to
protect national security and to comply with requests from other
countries by transferring people away from the United States
through informal means.
In no surprise to the American public, the President and his
functionaries have hinted that irregular rendition is an important
part of their strategy for combating terrorism since 9/11.179
Although not many people accept the Bush Administration's
arguments at face value, far fewer say that irregular rendition is of
no importance to the United States. Something must be done,
after all, about suspected terrorists. Not many people, as much as
176 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding that criminal
defendants have a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution).
177 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510-11 (noting the Government argued that, because of
Hamdi's enemy combatant status, he did not need to be afforded a right to counsel).
178 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
179 See Human Rights Watch, United States: Stop Handing Over Detainees to
Torturers, Nov. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/11/syria 110703.htm.
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they oppose Guantanamo, have suggested releasing all those
prisoners into the United States.
In sum, the rendition proceeding does not need to be a formal
trial which requires an advocate's mastery and a full appreciation
of the rules of evidence. Even if counsel for the suspect is
permitted, the executive branch will insist, as it does in civil and
criminal cases which involve classified information, that all
counsel obtain a security clearance to participate in the
proceeding. That insistence would be reasonable. As noted, many
negotiations about rendition take place in the privileged realm of
diplomats and intelligence officers. Since the back and forth often
treads on sensitive matters of state, some countries may only take
prisoners if their cooperation with the United States is kept secret.
Another possibility is for the special court to maintain a list of
cleared advocates for the prisoners about to be transferred by
rendition. What this possibility loses in free choice of counsel, it
regains in having experienced and trustworthy representation. As
in many other administrative settings, there is a full range of
choices somewhere between appointed counsel and pro se
representation. 18 This essay, in homage to Hamdi's pragmatism,
offers a sketch for those who seek solutions in the daunting space
between the extremes.
C. Legislative Action
Under my broad umbrella, any proposal to tinker with the
current practice of irregular rendition could be covered as a Hamdi
variation. Just so, Senator Joe Biden's legislative proposal, the
National Security with Justice Act,'81 is a variation on our theme.
In a bill which Senator Biden introduced in 2007, he tries to
take irregular rendition away from the total discretion of the CIA
and the Pentagon. 82 Under his bill, for a rendition to be legal, it
must be certified as necessary by the Attorney General or the
Deputy Attorney General, then approved by the FISA court
18o See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2008) (granting the claimant right to counsel in
administrative hearings, but providing for pro se representation as well).
181 National Security With Justice Act, S. 1876, 11 0th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_cong__bills&docid=
f:s 1 876is.txt.pdf.
182 See id.
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through a specific order that, among other things, gives the name
of the person to be transferred. 183  Rendition, under Senator
Biden's variation, would not be an affirmative tactic in American
counterterrorism. Rather, it would be an alternative when
"ordinary legal procedures" have failed. Unless the executive
official can show that it would be futile to try these ordinary
procedures or that they would be "inadequate" to protect
intelligence sources and methods, he or she must describe to the
FISA court the ordinary legal procedures that have been tried.
184
Thus, Senator Biden is more ambitious than I have been in this
essay. Not only does he propose more process, he tinkers with the
substance of the law. He would apply a "substantial likelihood"
test to the possibility that a suspect will be subjected to either
torture or to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, arguably a
lesser form of mistreatment than torture.' 85 That goes beyond the
specific terms of the Convention against Torture. 86 Article 3 of
the CAT, assuming it has extraterritorial effect and has not been
trumped by a commander-in-chief override, only prohibits
transfers when there are substantial grounds for believing torture
will occur in the receiving country.'
8 r
My approach to irregular rendition is more incremental than
Senator Biden's. Trying to leave the substantive markers
unchanged, I go step by step on procedures to provide a better
policy. If, at the end of all these steps, one is still convinced that
the practice of rendition is unfair and ineffective, then one can
change the markers. If nothing else, this essay shows an academic188
more modest than a politician. One time, realism takes theplace of idealism.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 His supporters would probably argue that he goes no farther than the ICCPR or
other parts of international law.
187 CAT, supra note 45, at art. 3.
188 But I suspect that the written contributions from other academics on this
symposium will be as idealistic as, if not more idealistic than, Senator Biden.
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